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Labor Markets and Evaluations of Vocational Training Programs
in the Public High Schools —Towarda Framework for Analysis
ABSTRACT
A simplified model is constructed to analyze the role played by vocational
training programs In high schools. The model assumes that there are two kinds
of educational programs in high schools, vocational and general. It also
assumes that there are two types of jobs for high school graduates. One job
requires training that either can be obtained from a vocational program in
high school or as general training on the job. The other job has no special
training requirements.
The model is used In two ways. First, it is used to examine how the
equilibrium outcome is affected by limitations on the number of places in the
vocational training program and by the minimum wage. Second, it helps to
determinewhat canbe. laarnea: fionistudis that take Wiat has become a. standard
approachtoevaluating high school vocational training programs —attempting
toestmate. th,e productIvity o thsaprogram by cornparing. the earnings o'f
vocationaland nonvocational program graduates.
Weconclude that whether or not limitations on enrollments Invocational
programsand minimum wages influence the wage difference between vocational
and nonvocational program graduates, findings based on the standard approach
to cost—benefit analysis of high school vocational training programs may
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(603) 646—2531Vocational training is a frequently elected program in high schools. Of
the more than 22,000 high school seniors included in the National Longitudinal
Survey of the high school class of 1972, fully 24 percent followed this course
of study. As maybeexpected for a large public program, there have been a
number of studies attempting to evaluate vocational education programs in the
public schools. Commonly, the evaluation consists of measuring the difference
in earnings and employment experience between those who enroll in vocational
programs and those who do not, and making a comparison of the appropriate dif-
ferential with program costs. Considerable effort has been made by some re-
searchers to standardize for differences in students' backgrounds, abilities
and non—observable characteristics, and for variation in program quality.1
However, few of these studies question whether earnings or employment differ-
entials are really an appropriate measure of the value of vocational programs.
Presumably, the principal issue is the effect of a vocational program on
economic welfare. To measure the effect of a vocational program, one must
compare economic welfare in the presence and absence of such a program. It is
not sufficient simply to measure the differences in circumstances between
those who enroll in the program and those who do not. Indeed, we will show
that under some circumstances a program may be associated with a narrow or
even no differential, and yet it may have a large positive effect on the over-
all economic welfare of all students.2
Earlier studies of this type include Taussig (1968) and Corazzini
(1968). Meyer and Wise (1979) conclude that high school vocational programs
are not productive after finding no difference in earnings or employment ex-
perience between those who had enrolled in the program and those who had not.
2
We do not focus in this analysis on social as well as private returns
to vocational programs. Our main focus is on how to measure the benefits from
vocational training programs accruing to high school graduates. A complete
discussion would consider the effects of the program on the returns to other
factors, and would also consider the effects of taxes used to finance anyad-S
ditional costs of vocational training in high schools.These ideas will be further explored in the remainder of the paper. A
simple model with two kinds of jobs and two kinds of high school programs will
serve as a basis of analysis. The economic welfare of the students will be
approximated by the present value of their earnings. It will be seen how
various features of the labor market——e.g., the demand for vocationally
trained workers and for other workers, the cost of alternative on—the—job
training programs, and the size of the vocational training program itself--all
help to determine the level of these earnings. In addition, the analysis
will investigate how these same features influence the earnings differentials
between those who have completed a vocational course of study and those who
have not. This will help to illuminate the relationship between the level of
earnings and the earnings differentials measured by many studies. There is
also an interesting sidelight to our analysis. Feldstein (19731, Mattila
(1978) and Mincer and Leighton (1979) have all noted that minimum wages may
limit the extent of general on—the-job training because such training is fi-
nanced by a reduction in wages during the training period, and a floor on
wages limits any wage reduction. An expected result is that jobs will be less
available to those who are untrained, opportunities for on—the—job training
will be reduced in the face of a minimum wage, and there will be some tendency
to prolong schooling.3 Our model permits an analysis of the impact of the
minimum wage in a setting which has not been considered previously. We find
that an effect of a successful vocational training program in the high schools
would be to mitigate the adverse impact of the minimum wage.
Before turning to a discussion of the basic model, one point should be
emphasized. This paper simply assumes that the vocational education program
3
For evidence consistent with this scenario, see also Custman and
Steinmeier (1979).—3—
is effective and then analyzes its potential impact in the labor market. It
• provides no evidence on whether the program is actually effective. Such evi—
• dence maybeprovided by subsequent empirical tests of the model. The analy-
sis does imply, however, that negative findings of earlier empirical studies——
findings of no difference in earnings between vocational program and other
high school graduates (e.g., see Meyer and Wise, 1979)——need not imply that
vocational training is ineffective.
Section I explores the impact of vocational education in a model with an
inelastic supply of high school graduates and with no effective minimum wage.
The possible effects of having the alternative of dropping out of school or
continuing beyond high school is introduced in the form of a positively sloped
supply curve in Section II. Section III analyzes the effects of a vocational
program in the face of a minimum wage. An issue which needs to be considered
when estimating the returns to vocational training is discussed in Section IV,
while V contains some concluding comments.
I
To keep the model as simple as possible, while retaining essential ele-
ments of behavior, we assume that high school students may enroll in only two
kinds of programs, called here vocational training and other high school
training. Upon graduation, they may work in two kinds of jobs, denoted as T—
type and 0—type jobs. The T-type jobs require training which may be obtained
either on-the-job or by enrolling in a vocational program in high school. The
training is general rather than specific——i.e., it is of use to more than one
firm (Becker, 1975). The 0—type jobs require only a traditional high school
education. Young people with similar training are assumed to be equally pro-
ductive when employed in similar jobs, and on-the-job training and high school—4--
vocational training are assumed to be equally effective preparation for T-type
jobs.
Consider first a model in which there is a fixed number of students, N,
who will be graduating from high school and entering the labor market. These
students are presumed to prefer very slightly nonvocational programs and to be
indifferent between the two types of jobs available after graduation.4 A fur—
ther important simplification is that the role of uncertainty is ignored. Fu-
ture wages are known with accuracy, and no account is taken of the possibility
that a student might want to change his or her mind after enrolling in one
high school program or the other. Thus any difference in the tioptionhi value
of the two programs associated with the greater acceptability of graduates of
one of the programs to institutions of higher education is ignored. Finally,
perfect capital markets are assumed. This implies that students are concerned
with the present value of their earnings streams and not with the distribution
of those earnings over time.
For students choosing the vocational training program, the present value
of their earnings streams is given by
w =fwe_Ytdt V
wherewT is the annual wage in T—type jobs, S2 is the time period over which
the student expects to work, and y is the net effect of real wage growth and
the discount rate over time. Throughout this paper, upper case W's refer to
We assume the difference in preference is so small it will create an
imperceptible compensating differential in the wage. While it would not be
difficult to incorporate explicitly a strong differential preference for gen-
eral or vocational schooling, the presentation would be complicated without
changing the thrust of the analysis. The very slight preference is enough to
insure that in the model students do not elect a vocational program while
never intending to use the training.—5—
discounted earnings streams, and lower case w's refer to annual wages. Defin-
ing the constant k as
k =fe'tdt,
the discounted earnings stream for a student electing the vocational training
program is
W =kw v T
For students enrolled in other high school programs, the discounted earnings
stream in 0—type jobs is similarly given by
W0 =Iw0eYtdtkw0,
where w0 is the annual wage in 0—type jobs.
Students in other high school programs who later engage in on-the-job
training for T—type jobs must divide their working life into two parts. Dur-
ing the first part, denoted by 21, they must accept an annual wage belowWT
reflecting both the direct costs of training and the reduced productivity dur-
ing the training period. If this amount is given by an amount "a" per year,
then the net annual wage to these workers during the period of on—the—job
training is WT -a.During the remainder of their working life, denoted by 2'
they receive the usual wage for people working in T—type jobs, WT. Thus, the
present value of wages for people electing on—the—job training is
=I(wT
—a)eYtdt + IwTedt.
Defining the constant k' as—b-
k' =feItdt,
the present value may be rewritten as
W =kw —k'a=W -k'a. t T v
Note that, by construction, k' < k.
Now consider the determination of the wage levels, WT and w0, for the
two types of jobs. On the demand side, wages for workers of the generation
under consideration are given by the net demand equations
wT =dT(N+ Nt)
=
whereN0 is the number of workers in 0—type jobs and where N and Nt are the
numbers of workers in T—type jobs who have had vocational and on—the-job
training, respectively. Lower case d's indicate demand functions in terms of
annual wages, while the upper case D's used later represent demand functions
in terms of discounted wage streams. On the supply side, workers are presumed
to choose their participation in vocational or on—the—job training to maximize
the present value of their earnings. This is subject to the constraint that
the number of workers who have undergone vocational training cannot exceed the
capacityof the vocational training program, given by C.
Letus begin the analysis with two extreme cases. The first case sup-
poses that vocational training is available to all who desire it. Under such
circumstances, it is clear that no one will opt for on—the—job training, since
the present value for earnings for vocationally trained persons is higher by
an amount k'athan for on—the—job trained persons. Students will elect—7—
vocational training until wages for vocationally trained persons are driven
downto the same level as those for students in the other high school pro-
grams.
Figure1 illustrates the result. D0(N0) =kd0(N0)is the demand func-
tion for high school graduates in 0—type jobs, expressed in terms of the dis-
counted earnings stream.5 With Nt= 0, D(N) =kdT(N)is the corresponding
demandfunction for vocational training graduates. Students elect the voca-
tional training program until wages there are equalized with the earnings of
other program graduates. This occurs at a present value earnings level of
with a corresponding yearly wage of N** students elect the voca-
tional training program and N** students the other high schbol programs, with
N** +N**=N. V 0
Theother extreme case occurs when vocational training is not available
at all in the high schools. Under such circumstances, N =0,and the demand
curve D for vocational training graduates is irrelevant. The demand by em-
ployers for workers in T-type jobs must be fulfilled by on-the—job training.
Expressed in present value terms, the demand for on—the—job trained persons is
Dt(N) =kdT(Nt)
—k'a,which must lie below the corresponding curve D for
vocational training graduates. Here, workers elect on—the—job training until
the earnings advantage for such training is eliminated. This occurs at an
earnings level W, with Nworkersremaining in 0-type jobs and Nengagingin
on—the-job training and going into T-type jobs. In comparison to the unlimited
vocational training case, wages and employment in T—type jobs are both less
here, and employment in 0-type jobs is higher.
This relationship between yearly wages and discounted earnings streams
implicitly assumes that the analysis is of the "steady state" variety.—8—
Figure 1
Market for 0-type employees Market for T-type employees
Now consider the cases falling between the extremes, cases in which the
number of vocational places is positive but limited to some number less than
the number who would attend if there were no limits.6 First, let vocational
training be introduced in the high schools at any level C between 0 and N.
These C workers will fill T—type jobs, and an additional N -,Cother program
graduates will undergo on—the—job training to work in T—type jobs. This again
equalizes the wages of general training graduates whether they remain in 0—
type jobs or undergo on-the-job training for T-type jobs. The wages of other
program high school graduates remain at W so long as C is less than N.The
6
Newspapers (e.g., New York Times, Survey of Education, January 6,
1980) and available scholarly material (see the discussion in Nelson [1977];
e.g., pp. 132—133) suggest that there has been a dramatic turnaround in the
vacancy—enrollment situation in vocational programs. Instead of vocational
programs consituting a lower track to which those at the bottom of the class
are assigned, many schools have to contend with excess applications for availa-
ble places in vocational training programs. It appears in practice that the
vocational track in a comprehensive high school may provide a program that is
less desirable than the program available in regional vocational centers. The
basic organization of these programs differs from state to state.
**
w—9—
wages of vocational training graduates are W, which is higher than W by an
amount k'a. This amountreflectsthe fact that vocational training graduates
need incur no additional training expenses to engage in P-type jobs.
If more than but fewer than N** vocational training positions are
available, then the wage for vocational training graduates will be given along
the demand curve D and will be less than W. The number of other program v v
graduates remaining to fill 0—type jobs falls below N*, and wages for 0-type
jobs rises above W* according to the demand curve D. The wage differential
between 0—type and P—type jobs narrows to less than k'a, and no one undergoes
on—the-job training if C > N*.
The preceding analysis indicates that there is a relationship between
wages for other program and vocational program graduates and the size of the
vocational training program. Figure 2 illustrates this relationship. Wages
for the two types of graduates are constant at W and W as long as the voca-
tional training program has fewer than C* positions, where C* =N.If there
are more than C positions, the wages for the two groups narrow until equality
is reached at C positions. C** corresponds to the quantity N** in Figure 1.
Many studies of vocational training programs seek to establish the dif-
ferential between the discounted wage streams of vocational and other program
graduates. In terms of Figure 2, they seek to establish the difference
W —W.Thisdifference is related to the current actual size of the voca— V0
tionaltraining program, but the possibility of a relationship between the
wage differential and the size of the vocational training program is almost
universally ignored.
The wage differential found by these studies measures the value of the
vocational training program to the marginal enrollee in the program. In other
words, it answers the question: If the program were to be cut back (enlarged)—10—
by one position, what would happen to the wages of that person dropped from
(added to) the program? More importantly, it does not answer the question:
What is the effect of the vocational training program on the wages paid to the
N graduates of both programs?7
Figure 2
Wages as a Function of Vocational Program Capacity
*_____________________ Legend
—-----Wa
This point may be illustrated by referring to Figure 2. If the voca-
tional training program has C positions, the measured wage differential be-
tween vocational training and other program graduates will be zero. And yet
with openings, wages are W, versus the figure of W" which would occur in
the absence of any vocational training program. Hence, the value of the Voca-
tional trainingprogram to the N workers is W** —Wper worker, in spite of
the fact that the measured wage differential between vocational training and
The reader is again reminded that our discussion focuses on the value
of private returns to high school graduates rather than social returns to vo—
cational training.—11—
other program graduates is zero.
The effects of the vocational training program on the N workers may be
summarized by looking at the total wage bill of the workers. Figure 3 depicts
the relationship between this wage bill and the size of the vocational train-
ing program. The wage bill is found simply by adding the wages of the general
training and vocational training graduates separately:
(1) WB =CW(C)+ (N —C)W(C),
where W and W are the functions of C indicated in Figure 2. V 0
For levels of the vocational training program less than C*, the wage
bill reduces to:
=* +(N -C)w* v 0
=* +(W* —W*)C. 0 v 0
Figure 3




This is a straight line with intercept NW* and slope W —W,as indicated in
Figure 3. Note, however, that as the vocational training program is increased
in this range, the resulting increases in the wage bill are not being shared
equally. Rather, they accrue to the students who manage to win positions in
the vocational training program.
Beyond C, the wages of the vocational training graduates begin to de—
dine, but the wages of the other program graduates increase. The net effect
on the total wage bill is indeterminate in this area. Theslopeof the wage
bill as a function of vocational training program size is found by differen-
tiating equation (1), and substituting D and D0 for W and W.
dWB/dC =(1+ _!_)D(c) -(1+ —)D(N —C).
In this equation, D and D are the labor demand functions in Figure 1, and E V 0 V
and are the elasticities of these demand functions. Depending upon these
values, the wage bill may either rise or fall to the right of C*, as indicated
by the alternative functions in Figure 3. In any case, it is clear that the
wage bill at C must exceed that at C =0,since W> W.
The principal point of this discussion is that the overall value to the
workers of a vocational training program of size C must be found by comparing
the wage bill at C with the wage bill which would have been observed in the
absence of the program. Merely calculating the difference in present dis-
counted wages between vocational training graduates and other graduates will
give the value of the program to the marginal enrollee, but it may give very
misleading estimates of the total value of the program.—13—
II
In this section, we drop the assumption that the total number of high
school graduates is fixed at N, thus implicitly introducing the option of se-
lecting some level of schooling other than terminating education after comple-
tion of high school. Instead, the amount of labor supplied to jobs requiring
a high school degree is taken to be a function of the wage rate available to
the workers:
(2) N =L(W),where L' > 0
A new complication arises when a positively sloped supply function is intro-
duced into the analysis because all workers do not receive the same wage. In
most cases, the discounted wage is higher for a person enrolling in a voca-
tional training program than for one who does not. Since different individuals
have different reservation wages and also receive wage offers that differ, the
exact number who choose a high school degree depends on which wage offers those
with different reservation wages receive——i.e., on the mechanism which allo-
cates positions in vocational training programs to those with different reser-
vation wages. To pursue the analysis further, we specify the labor supply
function in more detail.
Let W, be the wage prevailing to vocational training graduates, and let
L(W) be the labor supply that would come forth if everyone were to be paid
this wage. Assuming that the probability of securing a position in a voca-
tional training program is independent of the reservation wage, the probabil-
ityof obtaining a position in the vocational training program (and the wage
that goes along with it) is C/L(W), and the probability of failing to get
into the program is 1-C/L(W).Now let L(W) be the number of people who
would choose exactly a high school education at the lower wage of other—14—
graduates. Of this number, L(W) C/L(w) of those who apply for admission
into the vocational training program succeed ingetting in. The remainder,
L(W).[l -C/L(W)J,apply to the vocational training program and fail to get
in, but are willing to work anyway at the lowerwage. The total number ending
up with a high school degree is this number plus the C persons who did succeed
in obtaining positions in the vocational trainingprogram:
(3) N =C+ L(W).[l -C/L(w)]
It can be readily verified that at constant levels of the twowages WandW,
participation will increase as the number of vocational training positionsC
increases.
The effect of substituting this new labor supply equation in themodel
can be summarized by the wage functions in Figure 4, which is analogous to
Figure 2 of the last section. While the detailed derivation of these results
below is a little tedious, they can be explained heuristically rathereasily.
The increasing vocational opportunities tend to draw additionalparticipants
into the market for high school graduates, which in turndepresses wages gen-
erally in this market.8 This accounts for the downward slopingsegments of
both W and W to the left of C*, whereas in the previous section theseseg-
ments had been horizontal. To the right of C*, vocational training hasex-
panded to the point where no more on—the—job training takes place, and, as be-
fore, further vocational training positions make the twowage rates converge.
To demonstrate these results more rigorously, consider the regions to
the left and to the right of C separately, and constructa simple model for
each. To the left of C*, some amount of on-the—job training takesplace. In
8
This same effect will raise wages in labor markets fo those attain-
ing some level of education other than a high school degree.—15—
this region, the wage differential between W and W must be just sufficient
Figure 4




to compensate for the costs of training:
(4) W —W =k'a. V 0
The two wage rates are determined by the demand function defined in the previ-
ous section.
(5) W =kd(N +N) vTv t
(6) W =kd(N) 0 0 0
Since a variable N implicitly introduces the possibilities of pursu-
ing higher education after graduation and of dropping out before graduation,
and the wages of those in other markets, may be affected by their numbers, any
changes in wages for these people that do occur may in turn affect the demand
for high school graduates. This indirect effect is not treated in the present
analysis.—16—
If we now add the labor market clearing equation
(7) N=N +N +N V t 0
the five equations (3)—(7) may be regarded as a simple model with endogenous
variables N, N0, Nt, W0, and W. These equations may be totally differenti-
ated with respect to N to find out how the endogenous variables behave as N V V
(which is equal to C, the number of positions in the vocational training pro-
gram) increases. The results, all of which are unambiguous, are as follows:
dN/dN > 0 dN /dN > 0 dN /dN < 0 V 0V t V
dW/dN <0 dW/dN <0 0V VV
The negative total differentials for W and W justify the downward
slope of the two wage functions to the left of C* in Figure 4. Furthermore,
these results show that the number of workers engaged in on—the—job training
decreases monotonically as the number of vocational training positions in-
creases. If this number reaches zero at C, it cannot become nonnegative
again to the right of C*, implying that C is unique and totally separates the
region where it does not. Finally, it is of interest to note that the number
choosing exactly a high school education increases monotonically as C in-
creases up to C.
When the number of vocational training positions increases beyond C*, no
on—the—job training will occur. Corresponding to this, the wage differential
W —Wwill narrow to a figure less than k'a. In terms of the model just V 0
discussed, these changes to the right of C* require that equation (4) be re-
placed with the bonstraint:
(8) NtOiwhich simply asserts that no one is receiving on—the—job training in this
case. With this modification, the total derivatives of the model have the
following signs:
dL/dNindeterminate dN /dN <0 V 0 v
dW/dN <0 dW/dN >0 vV 0 V
Tothe right of C, wages of vocational training graduates must be de-
clining, simply because there are more of them. The additional vocational
training graduates reduce the supply of other program graduates; however, the
effect on the number of other program graduates may be partially offset by ad-
ditions to the labor force. In any case, the reduction in other program gradu-
ates raises the wages of those graduates according to the demand schedule, and
hence it narrows the wage differential between the two types of graduates.
At C**, the wages of vocational training and general training graduates
are equalized, and any further increases in vocational training positions will
remain unfilled. It is of interest to ask whether the wage rate associ-
ated with C** vocational training jobs, is greater or less than W, the wage
rate that would prevail were there to be no vocational training at all. This
question may be answered by a fairly simple argument.
Suppose that W <W*.From Figure 1, it is easy to see that this could
happen only if the labor supply at were greater than at 0. However, by
equation (3), the labor supply must be less at than at 0 if W** <W.
Thisestablishes a contradiction and implies that in fact W > W. Jience,
the existence of a vocational training program operatingata level C** in-
creases wages for all workers above the wage level which would prevail if
there were no such program. A corollary result is that the labor supply is
greater at C** than at C =0due to the higher wages there.—18—
Asin the previous section, the analysis may be continued by construct-
ing the relationship between the total wage bill and the size of the voca-
tional training program. Since both the wage per worker and the size of the
labor force have been shown to be higher at C** than at 0, the total wage bill
must be higher at However, it is impossible to establish the slope of
any specific segment of this relationship between 0 and without specific
values for the parameters. Note also that, to use the wage bill as some indi-
cator of the welfare effects of the vocational training program for those who
attain a high school degree, explicit allowance should be made for the oppor-
tunity wage for those who were attracted into this labor market from elsewhere.
III
This section extends the analysis of Section I in a slightly different
direction by considering how the labor market outcome is affected when there
is both vocational training in the high schools and a minimum wage. In this
analysis, high school graduates entering the labor force is fixed at N.
The impact of the minimum wage will be seen to depend on its level and
on the enrollment capacity of the vocational education system. In the lowest
range, the minimum does not constrain anyone's wage and hence has no effect on
the analysis of the first section. The first panel of Figure 5 illustrates
the situation in this range; this panel is the same as Figure 2 before. So
long as the minimum is below the critical level w1, it doesn't have any im-
pact.
At the critical level w1, the minimum begins to constrain the wage dur-
ing the period of training for workers engaged in on—the—job training. Where
does this impact begin? To answer this question, let w* and w* be the annual
wages associated with W and Wi', respectively. Since W and W' differ by the—19—
Figure 5
Effects of Various Levels of the Minimum Wage
(i) w<w rain m
































training costs kta, w* and w must satisfy the relation
w =w+ (k'/k)a. V 0
The annual wage during the training period for workers engaged in on—
the—job training is w* —a.This is the critical minimum wage at which the
minimum just begins to constrain training period wages:
1
(9) Wm =w-a=w-[(k-k')/k]a.
Within the next higher range for the minimum wage, from w1 to w2, the
minimum wage constrains training period wages but does not constrain wages
generally in either the 0—type or the T—type jobs. The situation in this case
is illustrated in the second panel of Figure 5.
If workers are trained on—the—job at the minimum wage, then the general
annual wage in the T-type jobs must be higher by the training costs a. At
this wage level, the firms desire to hire C1 workers for T-type jobs. If
there are fewer than C1 positions in the vocational training program, then the
firms will hire C1 —Cworkers for on—the—job training programs, where C is
the number of positions in the vocational training program. If there are more
than C1 vocational training positions, then there will be no on—the—job train-
ing, and the wages of vocational training graduates will move downward along
the demand curve DV
If there are fewer than C1 vocational training graduates, then these
graduates must be receiving a discounted wage stream equal to k(w. + a). By
using the relationship w. > w1 along with equation (9), it is easily shown
that this discounted wage stream is greater than the W' that the vocational
training graduates would have received in the absence of the minimum wage.
Hence, the demand curve implies that the C1 workers desired by T—type—21—
employers will be less at this wage than the C* workers desired at a wage of
W*.V
Withfewer than C* workers demanded by T—type employers at the wage
k(W +a),more of the high school graduates from other programs remain in
0—type jobs, and wages in that sector are reduced below the W that they would
achieve in the absence of a minimum wage. Hence, a minimum wage which con-
strains training for T-type jobs, but which falls below the wage in jobs not
requiring such training, increases the wage gap between vocational training
10
graduates and other program graduates working in 0—type jobs.
Two otherinteresting features of the model emerge when the minimumwage
liesbetweenw1 and w2, where w2 is the level at which the minimum would just
equalwages paid to those in 0—type jobs. First, other program graduates may
receivedifferent wages depending on whether or not they get into on—the—job
training programs. Because the wage differential between 0—type and T-type
jobs has widened, the higher wages in T-type jobs more than offset the reduced
wages necessary during the period of training. Because of this, more people
would like to enroll in on-the-job training programs than the firms are will-
ing to take, and positions in on—the—job training programs become rationed in
much the same manner as vocational training positions.
Secondly, if the minimum wage is in this range, the effect of the mini-
mum wage may be eliminated if the vocational training program is large enough.
If more than C* vocational training positions are offered, then no training
would have occurred even without the minimum wage. Since the minimum wage in
this range interferes only with on-the—job training, it will have no effect if
noon—the—job training would havetakenplace anyway.
10
This type of effect of the minimum wage has been previously noted by
Mincer(1976).—22—
If the minimum wage rises above w2, it begins to interfere with wages in
0—type jobs as well as with wages for people undergoing on—the—job training.
This situation is illustrated in the last two panels in Figure 5. As before,
on—the—job training can take place only if W is at least k(w. + a), so that
wages during the training period may at least be at the minimum. For this to
occur, there can be no more than C2 vocational training graduates in the third
panel or C4 such graduates in the fourth panel. If there are more vocational
training graduates than these, then the wages for T—type jobs will fall accord-
ing to the demand curve DTI and no on—the—job training will take place.
With a minimum wage above w2, wages in 0-type jobs may not be able to
fall far enough to create enough demand for all the workers seeking employ-
ment. Some unemployment among other prograni graduates would result. However,
if the minimum wage is below w (the annualized wage corresponding to W**).,
it is possible for a vocational training program to eliminate the unemployment
by providing the training for more people to enter T-type jobs. In the third
panel of Figure 5, this occurs if at least C3 positions are available in the
vocational training program. If, however, the minimum wage is at a level
above wr, then it is impossible for any vocational training program to re-
store full employment.11
The precise relationship governing wage determination is thus a function
of both the size of the vocational training program and the minimum wage.
Figure 6 summarizes the manner in which W ,W,andW are determined for V t 0
It is straightforward but tedious to analyze behavior in the face of
queuing and unemployment. We would need to explore the market clearing mecha-
nism in the face of queuing and the labor supply response to lack of job
availability. We do not introduce these added complications here. Note, how—
ever, that if there is both queuing and relatively free access to vocational
programs, overenrollment in vocational programs may become a problem. For re-
lated analyses dealing with these issues, see Gramlich (1976) ,Mincer(1976),
Mattila (1978), Leighton and Mincer (1979) ,andGustman and Steinineier (1979).—23—
various combinations of vocational program size and the minimum wage. A total
wagebill figure could be formed by adding these three figures with the appro-
priate weights. Note that the functional form in each area of the diagram
gives theexpressiondetermining the particular wage under consideration for
the,appropriate combination of vocational training program size and minimum
wage.
The principal implication of Figure 6 is that the wage determination is
an extremely complicated affair in the face of both a minimum wageand a limited
vocationaltraining program. Not only is the function governing wages not the
same throughout the diagram, but the functions in various parts of the diagrams
have different arguments. Consider, for example, the determination of wages
of vocational training graduates in panel (i) of Figure 6. In one of the re-
gions of the panel, the wage depends only upon the size of the vocational
training program, while in two other areas it depends only on the minimum
wage. In the fourth area, it does not depend upon either C or w.. Similar
complexities arise in the determination of wages, for on—the—job trainees and
for other program graduates who remain in 0—type jobs.
In sum, a vocational training program in the high schools which produces
a substitute for training on the job will mitigate and in some cases overcome
the adverseeffects of the minimum wage on on—the—job training and in creating
unemployment. The exact effects depend upon the size of the vocational educa-
tion program andthelevel of the minimum wage.Toevaluate benefits from vo-
cational educationprograms that arise because the program overcomes some ad-
verse impacts of the minimum wage, we would need to make strong assumptions
about whether constraints resulting from a minimum wage can, realistically, be
removed——e.g., by instituting a youth sub—minimum wage. Such an analysis would
place us well within the world of second-best.(i) Determination of W
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The previous results have strongly suggested that to estimate fully the
impact of a vocational training program, it is necessary to include the size
of the program as an explanatory variable. Even here, one must be extremely
careful about the functional form of the relationship between the size of the
program and the wages, especially in the presence of a minimum wage. Most
studies, however,, have not considered the size of the vocational training pro-
gram in assessing the impact of the program. What have these studies actually
measured?
Consider a study which draws a random sample from a population scattered
over several labor markets. The labor markets themselves differ in the size
of the vocational training programs serving them. Let the size distribution
of these programs be given by f(C). For simplicity, we will assume that all
the labor markets are of equal size N, but it would be straightforward to al-
low for varying labor market sizes too.
The probability that a randomly drawn individual will be a vocational
training graduate from a program of size C is given by
pCC) =(C/N)f(C)dC.
The f(C) is the probability of finding a program of the specified size, and
C/N is the probability of finding a vocational training graduate within the
specified labor market. The expected wage in a randomly drawn sample is found






The denominator of this express is the mean size C of the vocational training
programs. Hence, the expected wage may be rewritten as
(10) E(W) =1w(C) (c/c)f(c)dc.
A similar procedure finds the expected wage for other program graduates to be
(11) E(W) =fw0(c)I(
-C)/(N-C)]f(C)dC.
A note of caution is in order about these expected wages. There wages
represent the average wages for the two groups in a random sample of indi-
viduals. They may not, however, be used to measure the size of thewagedif-
ferentialwhich might be associated with an "average" or "typical" labor mar-
ket.
To measure the differential in an average labor market, it would be ap-






In comparing equations (10), (11), and (12), it is evident that E(Wv) in equa-
tion (10), by virtue of the factor (C/C), gives more weight to labor markets
with large vocational training programs than does the corresponding quantity
in equation (12). Similarly, E(W) in equation (11) gives more weight to
labor markets with small vocational training programs. Hence, neither E(Wv)
in equation (10) nor E(W) in equation (11) uses weights that are appropriate
for finding wages in an "average" or "typical" labor market. In other words,
in ignoring the effect of the size of the vocational training program
on the wage differential between vocational and other high school program—27—
graduates, the typical study oversamples wages from vocational graduates from
cities with large vocational programs and oversamples wages for nonvocational
graduates from those with small vocational programs.
V
The basic message of this paper is that a proper evaluation of voca-
tional training must do more than simply look at earnings differentials be-
tween vocational training and other high school program graduates. These
earnings differentials indicate the value of the program to the marginal per-
son, but they do not indicate the overall value of the program to all high
school graduates, or even to all vocational training graduates. Even worse,
it is possible that the earnings differential may give very misleading indica-
tions of the value of the program, indications that are the opposite of the
truth. For instance, we have seen that a vocational training program may pro-
duce maximum benefits to the workers at precisely that point where earnings
differentials are narrowed to zero.
A proper evaluation of vocational training will encounter several diffi-
culties. Two sections of this paper have explored the complications intro-
ducedby a consideration of minimum wages and of a variable labor supply.
These complexities imply that great care must be taken if estimates of wage
relationships are to be accurate and unbiased. Otherwise, the estimates may
confound the effects of the programs under varyingcircumstancesand makeit
difficultifnot impossible to reach conclusions about the impact of the pro-
gram.
In addition,we have examined how the impact of the minimum wage is af-
fected bythe existence of vocational training in the high schools. After ex-
ploringthe relation between the level of the minimumwage,the capacity of—28—
thehigh school vocational training program, and wages, employment, and train-
ing of high school graduates, we conclude that vocational training programs
mayreduce or eliminate any adverse impact of the minimum wage, both on the
level of training and on unemployment.
As the title of this paper suggests, we believe the preceding material
constitutes only a framework for analysis. This framework may be expanded in
a number of ways.
1. The modelassumesthat vocational training in the high schools sub-
stitutes completely for general on—the—job training. Implications of the
existence of some general on-the—job training not provided in public schools,
specific training which may or may not be complementary with general training,
12
and private vocational training should be explored.
2. Vocational training programs differ in quality. The analysis may be
modified to consider the role that the quality of vocational programs plays.
3. The model specifies a particular role for vocational training-—
namely, as a substitute for general on—the—job training. By introducing into
the analysis federal subsidies to on—the—job training, wage rate subsidies,
and other related policies, one can explore the interrelations between labor
market programs typically supervised by the Department of Labor and voca-
tional education programs which are the responsibility of the new Department
of Education.
As we noted at the outset, we have assumed throughout the paper that vo-
cational training provided in the high schools is indeed useful on the job.
While in the absence of an empirical analysis, we cannot tell whether this
assumption accords with the facts, our analysis has indicated that current
12
For an analysis of private vocational training, see Freeman (1974)
and Olson (1977).—29—
approaches for evaluating the contribution of vocational trainingprograms in
the high schools may be seriously flawed. Our discussionsuggests an approach
to estimation which should remedy these shortcomings.—30—
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